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10.1  Introduction: Psychopathology,  
or the Enlightenment in Psychiatry
What is psychopathology? A rather sketchy, but not incorrect, answer is that psy-
chopathology is a logos for pathos, i.e. a discourse about what troubles a person. 
Psychopathology provides a language to assess and make sense of the phenomena 
that express the vulnerability of the human person. Among the disturbing experi-
ences that affect a person, emotions play a major role.
According to Jaspers, the founder of this discipline, psychopathology has two 
major aims. First, it offers ‘clarification, order, formation’ (GP, p. 33/38),1 i.e. con-
crete descriptions, a suitable terminology, and systematic groupings that allow us 
to bring order into the chaos of disturbing mental phenomena as recounted by the 
patient and observed in her or his behaviour. Second, it aims at ‘a psychopatho-
logical education’ (GP, p. 44/50), i.e. endowing clinicians with a valid and reliable 
philosophical background, that is providing a philosophically sound methodology.
1 We use the English translation of Allgemeine Psychopathologie (1997). With the aim of facilitat-
ing the process for readers who work with, or simply want to consult, the German original, we also 
refer to the pagination of the 7th edition of this work (1959). So in our references to Jaspers’ text, 
the first page number refers to the English translation, whereas the number after the slanted stroke 
refers to the German original. When we disagree with the English translation, we have tacitly 
modified the text. The cross-reference will allow the critical reader to judge if our alternative is 
acceptable or not. To avoid ambiguity, we have chosen to include the German originals of central 
words and concepts in brackets in the text and in square brackets in direct quotations.
T. Fuchs et al. (eds.), Karl Jaspers’ Philosophy and Psychopathology,  
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Was Jaspers right about the relevance of psychopathology for psychiatry? We are 
convinced that he was. Since this is not the place to flesh out an argument for that 
conviction, we will merely list a number of reasons why we agree with Jaspers that 
psychopathology is an indispensable tool for any psychiatrist:
1. Psychiatry is a heterogeneous discipline. Its adepts approach the ‘object’ of 
their discipline from many different angles, as for instance neuroscience, depth 
psychology, sociology, and philosophy, each of which has its own language, 
methodology, and practice. Psychiatrists therefore need a common ground and 
a joint language. To Jaspers, disturbing mental phenomena are the main facts 
for psychiatry, and psychopathology—whose main focus is on abnormal experi-
ences—is the shared language that allows clinicians with different theoretical 
backgrounds to understand each other when dealing with mental disorders.
2. Psychiatry addresses abnormal human subjectivity. Psychopathology attempts 
to define what is abnormal (rather than taking for granted commonsense views) 
as well as to grasp what is human in apparently non-human (e.g. irrational or 
nonsensical) phenomena.
3. Psychiatry aims at establishing rigorous diagnoses. Psychopathology is still 
highly useful in a field where the major disorders cannot be neuroscientifically 
defined as disease entities, but are exclusively syndromes that can be defined 
according to characterising symptoms such as, notably, abnormal subjective 
experiences.
4. Psychiatry is about understanding disturbed human experience, rather than 
simply diagnosing and classifying it. Psychopathology functions as a bridge 
between human sciences and clinical sciences, thus providing the basic tools to 
make sense of mental suffering.
5. Psychiatry is about caring for troubled human existence, rather than judging, 
marginalising, punishing, or stigmatising it. Psychopathology connects under-
standing with caring, and endeavours to establish an epistemological as well as 
ethical framework for this.
6. Psychiatry looks for a way to connect, or at least think together, first-person 
subjective experience with impersonal brain functioning. As Jaspers saw with 
admirable clarity, psychopathology is about bridging understanding ( Verstehen) 
and explaining ( Erklären) in research as well as in clinical settings.
A century or so after the birth of psychopathology, we can agree that ‘psychopathol-
ogy is the fundamental professional skill of the psychiatrist’ (Oyebode 2008, p. 3). 
However, if we still need psychopathology, which psychopathology do we need? 
(Gross and Huber 1993). We think that there are three kinds of psychopathology, or 
better, three levels of psychopathological inquiry (Stanghellini 2009):
1. Descriptive psychopathology: The aim of this level is to systematically order, 
define, differentiate, and describe specific mental phenomena. These phenom-
ena are thereby rendered accessible and can be described in specific terms. By 
grouping related phenomena on a purely phenomenological basis, the aim is to 
avoid any pre-established conceptual scheme or explicit theory about what these 
phenomena are. This is, of course, an ideal that demands a constant suspen-
15110 Jaspers on Feelings and Affective States
sion of our ‘natural’ attitudes and pre-conceptions in order to let the phenomena 
themselves come to expression and, so to say, speak for themselves.
2. Clinical psychopathology: This is a pragmatic tool for connecting relevant 
symptoms and diagnostic categories with each other, and thus for restricting the 
scope of the clinical investigation to those symptoms that are useful to establish 
a reliable diagnosis. As Kurt Schneider (1967) defined it, it is an instrument for 
‘pragmatic diagnostic use’, or the driving belt between the level of symptoms 
and that of nosographic syndromes (Rossi Monti and Stanghellini 1996).
3. Structural psychopathology: This must be considered the most ambitious level of 
psychopathology, namely that of reconstructing the overall meaningful structure 
of a syndrome. As Georges Lantéri-Laura puts it, ‘instead of the trivialities of 
semiotics, one puts it [psychopathology] at a level of global understanding […] 
at a level of synthetic knowledge’ (1985, p. 604). It endeavours to attain to a glo-
bal level of intelligibility, assuming that the manifold of phenomena of a given 
mental disorder is a meaningful whole and not just a collection of symptoms.
In the case of emotions, we do need a precise description of emotional experiences, 
including a sharp and comprehensive characterisation of feelings (such as anger, 
dysphoria, sadness, shame, jealousy, etc.). We also need to connect given psycho-
pathological syndromes with more or less definite types of emotional experience 
to enrich our system of classification of mental disorders. Finally, we need an in-
depth understanding of the life-worlds that different emotions bring about, and of 
the meaningful connections between feelings and cognition, perception, action, and 
values in each of these life-worlds.
10.2  Jaspers’ Ambivalent Attitude to Emotional 
Experience
To Jaspers, emotional experience2 is probably the fundamental topic in psychopa-
thology. This can be argued by reading, for instance, his pages on the early stages 
of acute schizophrenia and delusional mood ( Wahnstimmung)—an uncanny atmo-
sphere of unattached feelings. In these pages, an alteration of mood ( Stimmung) is 
at the origin of a deep metamorphosis of world experience:
The environment is somehow different—not to a gross degree—perception is unaltered 
in itself but there is some change which envelops everything with subtle, pervasive and 
strangely uncertain light. A living-room which formerly was felt as neutral or friendly now 
becomes dominated by some indefinable atmosphere [einer undefinierbaren Stimmung]. 
(GP, p. 98/82)
2 While in contemporary Anglophone philosophy there exists a significant conceptual difference 
between the term ‘emotion’ (intentionally—at times even cognitively—structured feelings with a 
more or less explicit propositional content) and the term ‘feeling’ (primarily referring to the per-
ception of bodily changes), throughout this article we shall use the two words interchangeably as 
the translation of the German word ‘Gefühl’. As we shall see in the fifth section, we believe that 
there is a point to Jaspers’ rather vague conceptual terminology for human emotional experience.
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The following stages of schizophrenia, including perplexity ( Ratlosigkeit) and the for-
mation of delusions, are traced back by Jaspers to these uncanny experiences brought 
about by a change in the mood ( Stimmung) of the person. Further, in the chapter deal-
ing with the patient’s attitude to his illness, he explains how these ineffable feelings of 
change amount to a pre-reflective awareness that something is not right:
At the beginning of a mental illness some persons undergo an uncanny feeling of change 
[unheimliches Gefühl der Veränderung] (as if they had been bewitched, enchanted, or 
there may be an increase in sexuality, etc.). All this adds to the awareness [Bewusstsein] 
of impending madness. It is difficult to say what this awareness really is. It is the outcome 
of innumerous individual feelings, not a mere judgment [Urteil] but something actually 
experienced [wirklich erlebt]. (GP, p. 415/345)
Subtle changes in our pre-reflective embodied engagement with the world, a change 
in existential feelings (Ratcliffe 2008), an uncanny emotional atmosphere, rather 
than explicit reflective disturbances, are what mark the beginning of psychosis.
Also, for Jaspers, feelings are fundamental to a person’s well-being and self-
understanding. For some persons, it is through a change in feeling and mood that 
they become aware of their own self; for instance, a basic emotional experience 
such as suffering ( Leiden) is a central component in the various limit-situations. 
The awareness that something is wrong or simply not as it should be disturbs the 
person, although he or she may not be able to say what is actually going on. In fact, 
it is precisely the elusive character of these objectless and cognitively impenetrable 
feelings (Goldie 2000, pp. 100–111) that is disturbing. Jaspers argues that persons 
undergoing such experiences often feel an ‘almost inescapable need [Drang] to give 
some content to such feelings’ (GP, p. 113/95), and goes on to provide a detailed 
description of how this emotional need can result in a cognitive enactment out of 
such objectless, but highly comprehensive feelings:
These new and unfamiliar feelings press for some understanding on the part of the per-
son who experiences them. Countless possibilities are contained in them which can be 
realised only when intuition, imagination, form [Gestalten] and thought [Denken] have 
created a coherent world. There is therefore always a path which leads from these immense 
feelings of happiness to recognition [Erkennen]. The experience of blissful feelings starts 
with a conscious clarity [Klarsehens] without there being no real content to present. The 
patients delightedly believe that they have grasped the profoundest of meanings. Concepts 
like timelessness, world, god and death become enormous revelations which when the state 
have subsided cannot be reproduced or described in any way—they were after all nothing 
but feelings. (GP, pp. 115/95–97)
Notwithstanding the central place of feelings in Jaspers’ clinical and existential 
analyses, he does not provide a systematic and coherent theory of human emo-
tions—neither in the GP nor in the minor psychopathological writings, not in Psy-
chologie der Weltanschauungen or in his philosophical works. While he works 
hard, in the GP, to describe and categorise various feelings and affective states, 
to account for which categories of abnormal affective states are related to which 
nosographic symptoms, and to attempt to make sense of the connection between 
emotions and extra-conscious mechanisms, these efforts remain scattered in several 
places and amount to a fragmentary picture of human emotional experience. The 
reader can—so to speak—see the single trees but is not provided with a panoramic 
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view of the whole forest. While he appears to be wary of extensive analysis of 
individual feelings and affective states, arguing that such an approach would most 
of the time ‘only end in a vast array of trivialities’ (GP, p. 108/91), he is outright 
dismissive of the possibility that feelings might teach us something about the cause 
and origin of mental disorders:
Attempts have been made to let almost all abnormal phenomena derive from feelings [aus 
Gefühle abgeleitet]. If we use the term ‘feeling’ to denote everything for which common 
usage permits us to use the word, there is always some truth in this, but then it comes to 
very little if we go on to derive delusions, for instance, from feelings. Delusions of sense-
lessness, sinfulness, and impoverishment were supposed to arise from a depressive affect 
in a rationally understandable way [rational verständlich], and it was generally supposed 
that the depressed patient concluded that there must be something which made him so 
miserable. People also wanted to explain delusions of persecution by the affect of distrust, 
delusions of grandeur by euphoric mood [Stimmung], but they did not realise that, though 
one may understand ordinary mistakes and over-valued ideas in this way, one can never do 
this with delusions [Wahnideen]. Furthermore, frightening hallucinations in sleep during 
fever or psychosis have been attributed to some kind of conditioned anxiety, and so on. We 
can, it is true, find meaningful connections [verständliche Zusammenhänge], and they can 
teach us something about the relationship of delusional content and previous experiences 
but nothing at all of how delusions, false perceptions, etc. could have come about in the first 
place. (GP, pp. 408–409/340)
So though feelings are central to the manifestation and subsequent development of a 
mental disorder, they are of no help whatsoever when it comes to understanding why 
or how a person suffers from such a disorder. In other words, Jaspers’ attitude to-
wards the role that emotions play in mental disorder appears to be rather ambivalent.
Now, we believe that explaining this ambivalence is imperative not only for 
understanding the role emotions play in Jaspers’ psychopathology. It is also a neces-
sary part of an argument for the relevance of Jaspers’ psychopathology in contem-
porary psychiatry and clinical practice. But before venturing an explanation, we 
first need to take a careful look at what Jaspers actually has to say about emotions 
and affective states in the GP.
10.3  Feelings and Affective States in GP: An Overview
Jaspers’ main description and analysis of emotions and emotional experience is 
limited to two paragraphs in GP, which add up to less than twenty pages. The first 
is found in Section One, § 5 (pp. 108–117/90–97), in the first chapter of Part One 
where Jaspers describes the phenomenology of individual features of our mental 
life. The section is entitled ‘Feelings and Affective States’ and is divided into a 
‘Psychological preface’ and a ‘Classification of abnormal affective states’. The sec-
ond place is in Section One, (a)-(b) (pp. 367–372/305–310), in the second chapter 
of Part Two where Jaspers deals with meaningful connections in our mental life in 
view of extra-conscious mechanisms. This section is entitled ‘Normal Mechanisms’ 
and of particular relevance here are the first two subdivisions ‘Experiential reac-
tions’ and ‘After-effects of previous experiences’.
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10.3.1  Previous Classification of Feelings
Jaspers introduces his treatment of feelings ( Gefühle) and affective states ( Gemüt-
szustände) with a psychological prelude. Here he laments the state of emotion re-
search at the time, which is lacking in clarity compared to research into sensation, 
perception, ideas, and even research concerning instinctual drive and act of will. 
In fact, he claims that both the word and the concept of ‘feeling’ remains highly 
confusing and appears to refer ‘to everything for which we can find no other name’. 
At the same time, though, he is, as we have seen, sceptical of the trivialities brought 
about by scrupulous description and analysis of individual feelings, so instead he 
sets out to provide a synthesis of previous classifications of feelings. This amounts 
to the following catalogue:
1. From a Purely Phenomenological Perspective: We have three basic ways of 
distinguishing feelings: (a) feelings that are an aspect of conscious personal-
ity ( Persönlichkeitsbewusstsein) and thus defining the self ( Ichbestimmtheit) 
are distinguished from feelings that lend colour to object-awareness ( Gegen-
standsbewusstsein); (b) distinction by means of opposition, e.g. pleasure and 
displeasure, tension and relaxation, excitement and calm; (c) feelings without 
an object ( gegenstandslos), i.e. how I feel in a given situation ( Zustandsgefühle 
eines Sichbefindens), are opposed to those directed upon some object.
2. According to Objects: Feelings of fantasy ( Phantasiegefühle), directed upon 
suppositions, are opposed to serious feelings ( Ernstgefühle) directed upon actual 
objects. Also, feelings of value ( Wertgefühle) that are either directed at the feel-
ing person herself or at something extraneous, and can be distinguished as being 
either affirmative or negative (pride or humbleness, love or hate).
3. According to Source: This classification is made according to the different layers 
of our mental life ( Seelenleben). Here we find four types of feelings (Scheler 
1966): (a) localised feeling sensations, (b) vital feelings involving the whole 
body, (c) psychic feelings (e.g. sadness, joy), and (d) spiritual feelings (e.g. a 
state of grace).
4. According to Significance: The significance of a feeling with regard to life 
( Leben) or to the purposes of life ( Lebenszwecke), i.e. feelings of joy can count 
as the expression of the promotion of a purpose in life, whereas feelings of dis-
taste can count as expressing a hindrance.
5. Particular Feelings vs. All-Inclusive Feelings: Particular feelings ( partikulare 
Gefühle) are those directed on specific objects or partial aspects of the whole, 
whereas in all-inclusive feelings ( Totalgefühle), the separate elements are fused 
into comprehensive affective states ( Gefühlszustände), e.g. irritable, ‘feeling of 
being alive’, etc.
6. According to Intensity and Duration: Here Jaspers follows what he calls ‘the 
old and practical’ division: (a) feelings ( Gefühle) are the unique and original 
commotions of the psyche; (b) affects ( Affekte) are momentary and complex 
emotional processes of great intensity with conspicuous bodily accompaniments 
and sequels; and (c) moods ( Stimmungen) characterise the state of mind ( Zumu-
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tesein) or inner disposition ( innere Verfassung) of a person; a mood is a result of 
prolonged feelings and colour the whole mental life while it lasts.
7. Feelings vs. Sensations: Feelings ( Gefühle) are states of the self ( Zustände des 
Ich) whereas sensations ( Empfindungen) are elements in the perception of the 
environment and of one’s own body (e.g. colour, tonal pitch, temperature). The 
latter is, furthermore, distinguished according to whether the sensations are 
object-directed ( gegenständlich) or merely express the state of the body ( leib-
zuständlich). In between those extremes, we find sensations that are both object-
directed and bodily expressions, i.e. feeling-sensations ( Gefühlsempfindungen) 
in which feelings, affects, and drives constitute a whole as is the case with, for 
example, hunger, thirst, fatigue, sexual excitation.
10.3.2  Classification of Abnormal Affective States
After this cataloguing of previous classifications of feelings and affective states 
(leaving the reader rather dissatisfied if not confused), Jaspers goes on to provide 
a tentative categorisation of abnormal affective states. He starts out by making a 
fundamental distinction between two kinds: (a) the genetically understandable af-
fective states ( genetisch verständliche Gemütszustände), i.e. the abnormally exag-
gerated and particularly coloured affective states that can nevertheless be under-
stood in view of some previous experiences or situations; and (b) the endogenous 
affective states that spring from something irreducible in the soul ( etwas seelisch 
Letztes), i.e. affective states that escape our understanding and can be explained 
only in terms of extra-conscious causes ( ausserbewusste Ursachen). He notices that 
language has enabled us to name many of these all-embracing abnormal affective 
states ( abnorme Gesamtzuständlichkeiten des Gefühls) such as grief, melancholy, 
cheerfulness, and he concedes that certain typical states can indeed be recognised, 
for instance, the gloomy mood of depression or the silly, awkward blandness of he-
bephrenia. Once again, however, instead of examining the nature and phenomeno-
logical character of this emotional tonality, he chooses merely to examine the most 
particular and noteworthy ‘out of the host of trivial affective states’ (GP, p. 110/92). 
What is most characteristic of this part, though, is his attempt to connect each cat-
egory of abnormal feeling with nosographic syndromes:
8. Changes in Bodily Feelings: Bodily feelings ( Leibgefühle) are closely related to 
physical symptoms. They constitute a foundation for our entire feeling-state ( des 
gesamten Gefühlszustandes), and often undergo a significant change in psycho-
sis and personality disorders. We have, however, only slight knowledge of these 
vital and organic feelings ( Vital- und Organgefühle) due to the fact that it is dif-
ficult to empathise ( kaum innerlich nachzufühlen) with pathological changes in 
bodily feelings. He notes, without commenting further, that Kurt Schneider con-
siders changes in vital feelings, located primarily in the limbs, chest, forehead 
and stomach, as the core of cyclothymic depression.
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 9. Changes in Feelings of Capacity: A feeling of insufficiency ( Gefühl der Insuf-
fizienz), e.g. being useless, incompetent, incapable of action, unable to think, 
remember, understand, and make a decision, are characteristic of depression, 
partly as primary phenomena and partly as feelings of actual insufficiency.
10. Apathy: We find the total absence of feelings ( Fehlen der Gefühle) in acute psy-
choses where the person is utterly incapable of taking an interest in what goes 
on around him. He appears to be ‘dead with wakeful eyes’ and completely indif-
ferent as to what befalls him. Accordingly, there is no incentive to action (abou-
lia), and the life of the person ( Seelenleben) is entirely governed by what Jaspers 
calls object-consciousness ( Gegenstandsbewusstsein), i.e. making sense of the 
world only in terms of rational understanding ( Verstand). Due to the paralysing 
character of this feeling-state, the patient will die if he is not fed and cared for.
11. The Feeling of Having Lost Feeling: The feeling of having lost feeling ( Gefühl 
der Gefühllosigkeit) is the odd experience of not having any feeling at all, which 
we find in psychopaths, depressives, and in the initial stages of all pathological 
processes. It differs from apathy by being a painful feeling of non-feeling ( Füh-
len eines Nichfühlen), a subjectively felt emptiness of feeling ( subjektiv emp-
fundene Gefühlsleere). And although the afflicted persons are convinced of not 
feeling anything, this non-feeling is characterised by an anxiety that becomes 
manifest in bodily symptoms.
12. Change in the Feeling-Tone of Perception: The change in the feeling tone of 
perception ( Gefühlsauffassung) is particularly complex in acute psychosis. Here 
we find an increase of feeling towards normal objects as well as alterations of 
the character of feeling ( Gefühlscharakter) resulting in abnormal feeling-sensa-
tions ( sinnliche Gefühle). Things take on a life of their own in the sense that one 
can speak of ‘a physiognomy of things’ ( Physiognomie der Dinge) expressing 
their psychic essence, e.g. cold and strange, clear and full of meaning, solemn 
and wonderful, divine and far removed, ghastly and spookish. Besides these 
feelings that are primarily object-directed, we can also find painful changes in 
empathic feelings ( Einfühlen in andere Menschen) which can lead to either an 
abnormally strong empathy or the opposite where people appear as automata or 
soulless machines.
13. Objectless Feelings: Experiences that cannot be understood in terms of their 
development ( genetisch unverständlichen Erlebens) manifest themselves in 
objectless feelings ( gegenstandslose Gefühle). These feelings are free-floating, 
and ‘[i]f they are to become meaningful to the subject, these feelings must 
first search for an object or try to create one’. Anxiety (in depression) is one of 
these objectless feelings. Jaspers distinguishes two basic kinds of anxiety: (a) 
a specific feeling-sensation of the heart that manifests itself vitally, affecting 
one’s body or parts of it; and (b) a basic state of the soul ( Seelenzustand) that 
involves our being human ( Dasein). Anxiety in general is closely related to 
bodily sensations such as feelings of pressure, suffocation, and tightness, comes 
in many shapes and degrees of intensity, and may result in slight, anxious ten-
sion as well as ruthless acts against oneself and others. However, Jaspers con-
cludes that ‘it is not possible to understand the existential anxiety any further 
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in a phenomenological perspective. It is the source of our existence ( Existenz) 
and a fundamental feature of our being human ( Dasein) as it manifests itself in 
limit-situations ( Grenzsituationen)’ (GP, p. 113/95). Anxiety often involves a 
lively feeling of restlessness ( Gefühl der Unruhe) that can, however, also come 
about without anxiety. In psychosis, this feeling of restlessness is heightened to 
a tension and a pressure that is often experienced by the person as an unbear-
able massive weight of impressions. Jaspers also describes abnormal feelings of 
happiness ( abnorme Glücksgefühle) as a multifarious objectless feeling-state, 
ranging from purely sensuous feelings of pleasure ( Lustgefühle) to religious-
mystical ecstasies of which the latter can be found primarily in schizophrenic 
persons.
14. The Growth of Worlds from Objectless Feelings: We have already mentioned 
this peculiar aspect of objectless feelings, namely, that they create an ‘almost 
inescapable need to give some content to such feelings’. Here Jaspers explains 
that, for example, feelings of happiness often involve feelings of clarity, experi-
ences of God ( Gotterleben), and feelings of absolution ( Begnadungsgefühle), 
which quickly drives the patient from the world of feeling into the concrete 
world of delusion, e.g. feeling holy, a child of God, the Messiah, a prophet, or 
Maria. These affective states are not only found in beginning schizophrenia, but 
also in epileptics or as a result of poisoning, and can also be found occasionally 
in healthy persons, for instance, in ecstatic mystics.
10.3.3  Extra-conscious Mechanisms
The concept of extra-conscious mechanism ( ausserbewusster Mechanismus) is par-
ticularly interesting, since such mechanisms ‘are the understructure of our mental 
life ( Unterbau des Seelischen)’ without which ‘the meaningful connections ( ver-
ständliche Zusammenhänge) could never be realised’, and as such they function ‘as 
an extra-conscious precondition of mental phenomena and of their effects on bodily 
function’ (GP, p. 364/303). As of yet, Jaspers notes, there has been no successful de-
scription of these mechanisms in more exact bodily or biological terms. In fact, the 
mechanisms ‘are not accessible to investigation’, and we can only know about them 
indirectly—grasp ‘a glimmer of meaning’ ( einen Schimmer des Verständlichen)—
through the effect of their meaningful connections in our mental life. They remain 
purely psychological and theoretical concepts helping us to bring some order into 
mental phenomena that can be captured by neither a purely somatic nor an intellec-
tualistic approach. One of the best guides to those hidden mechanisms, according to 
Jaspers, is still Nietzsche’s analyses of their effects. Any attempt to go beyond this 
modest conception of the extra-conscious mechanisms still remains unverifiable 
speculation—as is the case with the Freudian theory of our unconscious life, even 
though such theories may sometimes bring about ‘surprising insights’.
In order to avoid speculations of this kind or drown in the ‘infinite world of hu-
man experiences’, Jaspers deliberately confines his descriptions to how the extra-
conscious mechanisms affect the ‘different ways in which meaningful connections 
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come about in actuality’. He proceeds to describe how normal mechanisms are at 
work in reactions to experience, after-effects of previous experiences, dreams, sug-
gestion, and hypnoses (GP, pp. 367–381/305–317), and how abnormal mechanisms 
influence pathological experiential reactions, abnormal after-effects of previous ex-
periences, abnormal dreams, hysteria, and psychosis (GP, pp. 381–413/317–344).
Of these detailed descriptions, the first two are those most germane to Jaspers’ 
understanding of emotions:
1. Reactions to Experience (Erlebnisreaktionen): Out of the endless variety of 
human experiences, Jaspers picks out the fundamental experiences ( Urerleb-
nisse) that every human being undergoes through time, namely, experiences that 
momentarily shake or agitate a person and afterwards contribute to form his or 
her being ( Wesen). He distinguishes between two basic forms of fundamental 
experiences:
a. Violent emotional shocks ( heftigste Gemütserschütterungen) caused by sud-
den experiences. These include feelings of terror, horror, and rage and are 
often the result of life-threatening situations such as a sexual assault, an earth-
quake, or death.
b. Deep emotional changes ( tiefe Gemütsveränderungen) growing slowly out 
of a persisting destiny ( Schicksal). These prolonged emotional states may 
develop out of the vanishing of hope with increasing age, lack of positive 
experiences, lifelong captivity, the crumbling of self-deceptions, etc.
The violent emotional shocks bring a person into an emotional state and provoke 
experiences that appear abnormal when compared with humdrum everyday life. 
Such experiences can be considered normal so long as they can be controlled, do not 
have obscurely disturbing consequences, and remain within the range of what most 
people experience. These pliable criteria of normality are important to be aware of, 
for—as Jaspers writes—‘human beings have an extraordinary capacity for extreme 
endurance’. The deep emotional changes, on the other hand, are normally connected 
with sexuality, erotic life, anxiety about one’s life and health, money problems and 
material welfare, professional and social life, and not least with politics and religion. 
Understanding the deep emotional changes requires a different approach from the 
one used when dealing with violent emotional shocks. With regard to the latter, the 
extraordinarily intense character of the situation is normally the explicit cause of the 
emotional reaction, i.e. the reaction depends more on the situation and less on the 
individual person. Deep emotional changes are different because, to uncover mean-
ingful connections in these more subdued and inarticulate feeling-states, ‘we must 
apply ourselves to the particular content of each individual case’ (GP, p. 367/305).
2. After-Effects of Previous Experiences: Here Jaspers starts with the apparently 
obvious observation that ‘[e]verything we experience and do leaves traces and 
slowly changes our disposition [Veranlagung]’, and that a reversal of past expe-
riences and actions is impossible. To emphasise that this is not a trivial observa-
tion, he enigmatically claims that ‘[i]n this lies the personal responsibility [das 
persönlich Verantwotliche] involved in every single experience’. He individuates 
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five kinds of paradigmatic after-effects of previous experiences [Nachwirkung 
früherer Erlebnisse]: memory traces, practice, mechanisation, habits, and the 
effects of complexes. And since he has already dealt with the first three earlier 
(Part One, Chap. 2, ‘Objective Performances of Mental Life’), in this section he 
concentrates on the last two:
a. Habits ( Gewohnheiten) dominate our life to a degree that we are rarely aware 
of. They are, according to Jaspers, ‘[o]ur second nature [zweite Natur]’; they 
render many aspects of our life unremarkable or unnoticed, for better or for 
worse; and ‘the spontaneity of our psyche’ retires in front of this monotonous 
work of our habits. They derive from repeated experiences and have a lasting 
effect on emotional responses.
b. The effects of complexes ( Komplexwirkungen) are certain dispositions for-
med by the ‘[a]fter-effect of previous emotionally toned [affektbetonter] 
experiences, particularly unpleasantly-toned [unlustbetonter] ones’, and com-
plexes are ‘supposed to characterise a particular, irrational after-effect ari-
sing from some experience in the past’. He describes four typical after-effects 
involved in complexes:
1. Affects—like habits—can be fully roused again through association as 
soon as one element of the original reappears;
2. Affects can displace themselves so that objects experienced together 
with unpleasant experiences may appropriate their particular feeling 
( Gefühlscharakter). This displacement accounts, among other things, for 
the countless subjective values that people without any apparent reason 
ascribe to particular objects.
3. Unpleasant experiences are dealt with ( verarbeiten)—in one way or the 
other. Either we freely vent our emotional reactions to them ( Abreagieren) 
or we deal with them intellectually ( intellektuell verarbeitet).
4. Unpleasant experiences that are simply repressed or blocked out with-
out any such intellectual processing tend to show exceptionally strong 
after-effects—although repression can also take place without any effect, 
particularly in ‘indifferent and dull individuals’. The description of these 
extra-conscious mechanisms may immediately appear to be very similar 
to what psychoanalysis defines as defence mechanisms, but as we saw 
earlier, Jaspers prefers Nietzsche to Freud and his followers when it comes 
to the obscure forces at work in the human mind. One thing is certain, 
though: Jaspers does not underestimate the sway that such complexes hold 
over a person. In fact, he claims that ‘[c]omplexes have the tendency to 
dominate the person [Mensch] to such an extent that the person no longer 
has complexes, but the complexes have him’ (GP, pp. 371–372/309).
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10.4  Jaspers’ Asymptotic Understanding  
of Emotional Experience
Without any doubt, Jaspers’ psychopathology of emotional experience has many 
strong points which make it a valuable basis for further analyses and conceptualisa-
tions. He has made us aware that emotions are central to understanding mental dis-
orders. His argument for the crucial importance of suffering in mental illness shows 
that in order to understand mental disorders, we need to describe and understand, 
when possible, the subjective character and development of emotional experience, 
how emotions are connected with nosographic syndromes, and finally the person’s 
attitude ( Stellungnahme) to his or her emotional experience. In this sense, Jaspers 
admirably laid the foundation for psycho-patho-logy as a discourse ( logos) that 
endeavours to articulate the emotional suffering ( pathos) that troubles the human 
mind ( psyche).
Although his analysis of emotions is kaleidoscopic and remains incomplete, Jas-
pers manages to show that the phenomenological perspective of descriptive psy-
chopathology and the pragmatic perspective of clinical psychopathology cannot 
stand alone. They need to be supported by a more comprehensive, structural view 
of human nature if the clinician is not to fall prey to unwarranted prejudices or 
intellectual short-cuts, i.e. either ‘the brain mythologies’ ( Hirnmythologien) or the 
speculative ‘anti-reason’ ( Widervernunft) of psychoanalysis (GP, p. 18/16; Jaspers 
1950, pp. 17–24, 1951, pp. 221–230). This is the philosophical ambition behind 
the GP, already present in the first edition but becoming more and more explicit as 
Jaspers’ philosophy develops (Kirkbright 2008). We return to this structural level of 
his approach in a moment, but first we will evidence Jaspers’ achievement in regard 
to the descriptive and the clinical levels psychopathology defined in the beginning.
Jaspers’ insistence on phenomenology is basically an attempt to make a discourse 
about feelings, i.e. not to treat them as cognitive phenomena per se, but rather to 
use cognition to finely describe, rigorously define, and classify them systematically. 
This is of indisputable value to descriptive psychopathology, since there is always 
the risk of over-intellectualising when it comes to emotions (Goldie 2000, p. 41), 
that is to say, reading emotional experience as a result of cognitive problems rather 
than as a disturbance in our pre-reflective engagement with the world, other people, 
and ourselves. This emphasis on the significance of the emotional dimension of 
mental illness is one of Jaspers’ most important contributions to contemporary de-
scriptive psychopathology. And while we have come a long way since the GP, there 
is still much work to be done when it comes to describing, defining, and classifying 
the various aspects of emotional experience. It remains an open question to what ex-
tent we may speak of a dividing line between the cognitive and the affective aspect 
of human experience. It is certain, though, that if it is there, it is a highly blurred 
and unstable line that requires a constant phenomenological effort to distinguish the 
various feelings, emotions, and moods that are at work in human experience (e.g. 
Strasser 1956; Schmitz 1992; Fuchs 2000).
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Jaspers not only provides an outline of how to proceed along these descriptive 
lines; his analyses are also of clinical value, since they attempt to bridge between 
descriptive and clinical psychopathology by coupling various abnormal feelings 
(e.g. abnormal vital feelings) with nosographical syndromes (e.g. major depres-
sion). His pages on Wahnstimmung (GP, pp. 98–104/82–87), for instance, are still 
a classic and unsurpassed topos in phenomenological psychopathology. A particu-
larly important is the demonstration that the afflicted person’s experience of suffer-
ing ( Leiden) is the core of our understanding of mental illness. In this way, Jaspers 
succeeded in showing that emotional experience cannot be considered merely as a 
more or less accidental by-product of neurological or rational disturbances.
These descriptive and clinical achievements notwithstanding, Jaspers’ treatment 
of emotions is not satisfactory. What we seem to lack is a development of the struc-
tural level of a psychopathology of emotional experience. Jaspers does not provide 
us with a comprehensive theory of emotion that can help us understand not just the 
descriptive or clinical aspect of human emotional experience, but more generally 
the role emotions play in overall meaningful structure of pathological syndrome. 
However, without connecting the dots, so to speak, he does provide us with interest-
ing ‘hints’ in that direction.
One of these ‘hints’ is the outline of how to connect objectless feelings with the 
growth of ‘private worlds’, which marked an important advance in our understand-
ing of mental suffering that is still highly relevant today. Narratives of existential 
suffering and pathology serve as evidence of the need to have the person pinpoint 
her disturbing feelings of strangeness, non-familiarity, and alienation. The inter-
play between these unattached, free-floating feelings and the patient who takes her 
stance in front of them is the cornerstone of the dialectic model in psychopathol-
ogy (Stanghellini 1997a, b; Stanghellini and Rosfort, in press; Stanghellini et al., 
forthcoming); i.e. the growing of ‘private worlds’ out of non-intentional feelings 
is at the heart of the dialectical understanding of delusions and other fundamental 
psychopathological phenomena.
Another of these hints is Jaspers’ rather sketchy attempt to connect extra-con-
scious mechanisms with conscious feelings and cognitions, especially in the part 
on normal mechanisms. The intimate connection between the involuntary source of 
emotions and the way they structure the person’s field of experience and life-world 
is at the heart of contemporary research on emotions (e.g. Stocker 1996; Pugmire 
1998; Goldie 2000; Solomon 2007; de Sousa 2011), and is linked with the theme of 
the limits of human understanding. Jaspers’ psychopathology is an asymptotic kind 
of knowledge that tries to push understanding to its extreme limits without ignoring 
its limitations. Articulating emotions contributes to make intelligible what is cogni-
tively impenetrable, or unintelligible in terms of rationality.
When these two hints are held together, they bring out the mind-numbingly com-
plex interplay of necessity (fate) and moral accountability that lies at the heart of 
any pathology of the mind—as well as of any psychotherapy. To what extent can 
a person be held responsible for his own recovery? What is the relation between 
freedom and nature in mental suffering? Can we find a sparkle of freedom in the 
obscure regions of mental suffering, and if we can, how do we help the patient to 
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deal with the accompanying responsibility to articulate, make sense of, and even-
tually cope with that which troubles his fragile and vulnerable sense of being a 
person? This last aspect of Jaspers’ structural outline of the role emotions play in 
psychopathology discloses, we would argue, the reason for his reluctance to formu-
late a theory of emotions. The question of responsibility is fundamental to psycho-
therapy, because the way in which a clinician answers this question in the form of 
her approach to care and therapy (drug prescription, explanatory models, diagnostic 
criteria, etc.) reveals her—more or less articulate—philosophical understanding of 
human nature. The therapeutic engagement, in other words, reveals how descriptive 
and clinical psychopathology cannot avoid—in the therapeutic procedure—em-
ploying a basic structural view on mental illness that depends on some conception 
of what it means to be a human person.
When it comes to understanding human nature and personal responsibility, emo-
tions are perhaps the most notoriously obscure of our mental phenomena, and we 
believe that Jaspers’ philosophical awareness of this obscurity is the reason for his 
ambivalence towards human emotions. As mentioned earlier, emotional experience 
remains at the heart of his thinking, but not even his explicit philosophical writings 
provide us with a theory of emotions. We do not believe that this is simply the result 
of a careless neglect on Jaspers’ part. On the contrary, the unwillingness to construct 
an overall theory of emotion is part and parcel of the peculiar combination of phi-
losophy and science that informs and shapes his thinking about human nature—in 
psychopathology as well as philosophy. Jaspers operates with what has been called 
an ‘empiric-methodological Cartesianism’ (Wiehl 2008, p. 15; see also Wiehl 2007) 
characterised by a strict distinction between scientific explanation ( Erklären) and 
philosophical understanding ( Verstehen). Without going into the long and complex 
debate about this methodological dualism in Jaspers thinking, we will simply note 
that while Jaspers acknowledges and respects the inescapable explanatory signifi-
cance of the biological aspect of human nature, he nevertheless works with a philo-
sophical conviction that the freedom and responsibility of every single human per-
son is inexorable and plays a fundamental role in mental suffering (remember the 
enigmatic statement about personal responsibility above).
In the next section, we will explain how this ‘anthropological dualism’ (Wiehl 
2008) makes a philosophical understanding of human nature impossible. This, in turn, 
will enable us to make sense of his ambivalent stance towards human emotions.
10.5  Human Nature and Emotional Experience
In Part Six, written for the fourth edition in 1946, Jaspers famously argues that 
we are faced with the obligation ( Forderung) to integrate our knowledge of hu-
man nature with our psychopathological, because science demands a systematic and 
holistic approach (GP, pp. 748–750/625–626). The problem is, however, that this 
is not possible in a scientifically satisfactory way, since ‘in the end being human 
[Menschsein] itself remains an open question, and so too does our knowledge of it’ 
(GP, p. 749/626).
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Jaspers was well aware that this refusal to provide a comprehensive theory might 
give rise to objections to his work, among which the most obvious would be that ‘[t]
his psychopathology does not give any concretely united [gegenständlich geschloss-
enes] picture of the whole; everything is dismembered or else stands rigidly parallel. 
The multiplicity of the material and of the different approaches is confusing. No pic-
ture of the sick human being [Menschseins] emerges’ (GP, p. 747/624). Jaspers ex-
plains the reasons for his approach as follows: (a) what counts is whether the differ-
entiations between phenomena are sufficiently clear; (b) the non-systematic structure 
is motivated by a conscious rejection of succumbing to any one approach; and (c) 
he intends to oppose all dogmatic theories of being ( Seinsdogmatik). In other words, 
we should not look for a systematic design of human emotional experience ‘showing 
how everything we know has its place somewhere within this construct or as part 
of it’ (GP, p. 748/625). Rather, what we need to organise, writes Jaspers, is ‘the way 
we gain such knowledge’ (GP, p. 748/625). Jaspers adopts an eloquent metaphor: ‘A 
synthesis is not like an outline [Entwurf] of a continent but more like an outline of 
possible ways to explore it’ (GP, p. 749/626). What we need is a method rather than 
an ‘ontological theory of human life’ (GP, p. 749/626). Jaspers has epistemological 
as well as ethical reasons for his scepticism of strong metaphysical claims about 
emotions, and about human nature in general.3 Since we can know human nature 
‘only through ourselves—that is only through our contact [Umgang] with human be-
ings’ (GP, p. 748/625), we cannot aspire to arrive at an utopian epistemological ‘view 
from nowhere’ from which we are able to construct a scientifically warranted theory 
of human nature. The best we can hope for is a critical awareness of ourselves and of 
the methods we adopt to establish this human contact is quintessential. And from an 
ethical perspective, whenever we generalise single observations trying to establish a 
general theory, we renounce on the individual expressions of freedom that we experi-
ence through the contact with each single person.
The question of responsibility remains the crux of any attempt to explain and 
understand what emotions really are, how they influence our thought and actions, 
and eventually how we should cope with our emotions—in health as well as in 
illness. This inescapable connection between emotions and responsibility means 
that any explanation of emotions always involves a basic understanding of human 
nature—even if this understanding is not clearly formulated. This can be illustrated 
if, for a moment, we turn to a fundamental debate in contemporary philosophy of 
emotions. This debate concerns what emotions really are, and it is conducted from 
the perspectives of two incompatible types of explanations. On the one hand, we 
find the so-called feeling theories (e.g. Prinz 2004; Damasio 2003) that argue for an 
explanation of human emotions in terms of core evolutionary themes (e.g. survival 
and reproduction) and physiological changes in our body. On the other, we have the 
so-called cognitive theories (e.g. Solomon 2007; Nussbaum 2001) arguing for an 
explanation in term of intentional structures and cognitive operations in the light 
of ethical and societal norms. The principal difference between the two approaches 
3 For a historically careful and admirably clear philosophical treatment of Jaspers’ critical stance 
towards the philosophical anthropologies of his day, see Lehnert (2006).
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is that the cognitive theories opt for a view of emotions as constituted primarily 
by personal factors, while the feeling theories advocate a picture of human emo-
tions as primarily informed and shaped by cross-species, evolutionary themes and 
anonymous biological values. These two kinds of explanations of human emotions 
entail two fundamentally different pictures of what it means to be human. The cog-
nitive theories present us with a conception of human nature as being primarily a 
person whose existence is informed and orientated primarily by rational strategies 
and ethical standards, while the feeling theories insist that a human being is simply a 
biological organism functioning on a par with every other living organism in nature 
that knows nothing of rationality or ethical ideals.
The gist of what it means to be human in the cognitive theories is expressed with 
unabashed vigour by the late Robert Solomon:
[T]ypically, our emotions are both unplanned and more or less dictated by circumstances 
and it would make little sense to insist that we are responsible or ought to take responsibility 
for our emotional responses. But even so, there is a self-fulfilling prophecy involved here 
that cannot be easily denied […] When we look into our emotional life with the idea that 
we are or might be responsible and ask ourselves those probing questions, “what am I doing 
this for?” “What am I getting out of this?” we often see aspects of our strategic behavior 
that would otherwise escape us. By contrast, if we look into our emotional life with the idea 
that our emotions are forces beyond our control that happen to us, we are prone to make 
excuses for ourselves and resign ourselves to bad and destructive behavior that otherwise 
might be controlled. (Solomon 2007, p. 199)
This picture of a human being as a person ultimately responsible for his or her 
emotions is countered by Jesse Prinz, who argues for a biological understanding of 
human nature. Prinz does not deny that human beings are moral creatures, nor does 
he reject the inherent relation between emotions and moral values. In fact, he goes 
further than most cognitive theorists of emotions would be prepared to go by argu-
ing bluntly that ‘moral values are emotional values’ (Prinz 2012, p. 329). On Prinz’ 
account, however, emotions are not constituted by our cognitive engagement with 
the world, but by pre-reflective somatic signals in the physiological landscape of 
the body; or to put it differently, for Prinz, ‘somatic signals are both necessary and 
sufficient for emotions’ (Prinz 2007, p. 60). Emotions have their own impersonal 
life, and just as each person has her individual bodily constitution, shaped by core 
evolutionary themes and more proximate cultural factors, so her basic emotional 
constitution is developed in ways that are out of her control. A person may simply 
have what Prinz calls ‘a calibration file for amusement that contains representations 
of others’ misfortune’. The automatic function of such an emotional calibration 
leads him to conclude that emotional experience and emotional responses cannot be 
assessed or evaluated by the obfuscated ideas of personal responsibility, let alone 
by ethical standards:
It is not wrong to feel amusement when one encounters something that matches the contents 
of your amusement file. Nor is it right. Once a calibration file has been set up, we cannot 
help but react to its contents. This is one source of emotional passivity. The response to 
items in our calibration files is automatic, and falls outside the jurisdiction or normative 
assessment […] There is a sense in which the most heinous passion is as innocent as seeing 
an afterimage. (Prinz 2004, p. 240)
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Our intention with this brief excursion into a contemporary debate in philosophy of 
emotion is to show that explaining human emotions involves a conception of what 
human nature is that, as we have seen, Jaspers believes lies beyond the scope of 
human understanding.
10.6  Conclusion: Responsibility and Personal Suffering
As we have already seen, Jaspers is sceptical of attempts to arrive at a comprehen-
sive theory of human nature. In fact, a central pillar in his philosophy is exactly 
that an individual human being can never be explained by a general theory. The 
individual is a unique person who thinks, feels, and behaves in ways that escape our 
attempts to understand that individual through a theoretical approach. We may ex-
plain the particular aspects of an individual person, but we may never fool ourselves 
into believing that such explanations can lead us to an understanding of that person:
The human being as a whole never becomes an object of understanding [Erkenntnis]. Being 
human [Menschsein] cannot be systematised. Whatever the complex unity in which we 
think we have caught a human being, he himself has always escaped us. All knowledge of 
the individual has its own particular aspect; it always demonstrates one reality but not the 
reality of human nature. It is knowledge in suspense and not final. (GP, p. 767/641)
What is at work here is Jaspers’ notorious ‘theorem of incomprehensibility’ (Baeyer 
1979) that Wolfgang Blankenburg has elegantly explained in the following way: 
‘Where understanding ends, nature begins—be that in physiological form (e.g. fa-
tigue or sleep) or in pathological processes (i.e. in form of an illness that destroys 
the life of the mind [Seelenleben]. In short: Where understanding ends, we have to 
explain’ (Blankenburg 1986, p. 143).
Jaspers approaches human nature with what has been called a ‘methodological 
particularism’ (Rinofner-Kreidl 2008). This approach, he believes, is particularly 
warranted in psychopathology, where the suffering person risks becoming a mere 
‘object for medical interference [Objekt ärztlicher Einwirkung] in the sense that 
all behaviour [Tun] is considered a means to an end’, that is to say, in our capacity 
of trained clinicians and psychotherapists we are always in risk of neglecting the 
experience of the patient, in particular if we treat the person ‘according to certain 
fundamental opinions about human beings (that normally remain obscure), accord-
ing to conventional rules and common ideas about what is desirable, what is useful, 
and about human happiness’ (Jaspers 1956, p. 125). By turning the suffering person 
into an object for medical explanation, we have already implicitly decided upon 
the extent to which that person can be held responsible for his or her suffering. We 
thereby explain away the autonomy of suffering and occlude the fragile dialectics of 
rationality and biology at the heart of mental disorders. The person’s responsibility 
for his or her illness is always an open question that cannot be understood, but can 
only be approached in a careful exchange with the patient. We must, in other words, 
respect that human suffering is ultimately incomprehensible due to the obscure 
complexity of biology and rationality in human nature, while constantly trying to 
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improve our understanding and explanation of what it means to suffer. In this way, 
the ‘theorem of incomprehensibility’ can be understood as Jaspers’ attempt to safe-
guard the autonomy of the suffering person, without neglecting that a person’s sense 
of responsibility becomes severely disrupted in mental disorders.
Where does this leave us with regard to Jaspers’ ambivalence concerning emo-
tions and emotional experience in the GP? Now, as we have seen, there are few 
aspects of human experience and behaviour that warrant the ‘theorem of incompre-
hensibility’ as evidently as that of feelings and affective states.
First, explaining emotional experience in terms of a theory of emotions entails an 
understanding—be that articulated or not—of human nature. Jaspers thinks that such 
an understanding is impossible. To understand a person in the light of a theory would 
imply objectifying human complexity and sacrificing the individual person to our 
own norm of what a person is supposed to be or should be. What we need, according 
to Jaspers, is not an all-encompassing theory, but much more modestly a palette with 
different shades of colour that may allow the clinician to recognise the kind, the tonal-
ity, and the intensity of emotional experience at play in the single individual.
Second, emotions are the most embodied of our mental phenomena. We must 
acknowledge that it is close to impossible when it comes to emotional experience 
to disentangle what is purely biological (thus un-understandable) from what is af-
fected by our intentional and cognitive capacities.
Third, emotional experience is intimately subjective. Feelings may be irrational, 
stupid, alienating, or inappropriate, but still they are part of who we are. They are 
inescapable part of our character and thus that which makes us the unique individual 
that we are. Also, feelings are closely related to personal values and societal norms. 
All this makes them particularly difficult to handle from the perspective of an objec-
tive approach.
Fourth, the question of responsibility becomes explicit with regard to emotion-
al experience. Formulating a theory of emotions would necessarily mean taking 
a stance with regard to the extent to which a suffering person can be said to be 
responsible for her emotions. The question of the responsibility of the person in 
front of her emotions must remain open. No general theory can help us understand 
the concrete individual existence of a human person, i.e. what ‘the real, living ex-
istence of a human being’ (Jaspers 1956, p. 19). Nobody can choose her emotions, 
nonetheless, at least in some cases, we can decide whether to act accordingly to an 
emotion or not. The possibility (or impossibility) to decide depends on the propor-
tion between the quality and the intensity of an emotion and the person’s capacity 
to cope with it and make sense of it. This proportion, or disproportion, depends on 
many personal factors that escape an impersonal theory and conceptualisation, as 
for instance life-history, cultural and intellectual individual resources, personal val-
ues, present situation, societal constraints, etc.
Fifth, and most important, understanding the other person’s troubled emotional 
experience is not just an epistemological problem that can be solved relying on a 
general theory that does the job for us. Making sense of the other person’s suffering 
is an ethical problem that necessarily implies feeling and being responsible for the 
way I as a clinician understand it.
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